There is a growing policy interest in the role of financial structure in promoting development. However, very little is known about how different financial structures emerge and evolve. In this paper we empirically assess the political origins of financial structure. Using difference-in difference estimation and annual data, we study the effects of democratization on financial structure in a sample of 96 countries covering the period 1970 to 2005. Democratization here corresponds to the event of becoming a democracy. We find that democratization leads to a more market-based financial system. Democratic change could also be incremental rather than a one off. To identify the causal effect of incremental democratic change on financial structure we estimate a separate model and find that democracy matters. We also find that countries with substantial democratic capital are more likely to have a market-based financial structure. Our main results are robust to a variety of controls, instrumental variable estimation using commodity price and rainfall as instruments, Arellano-Bond GMM estimation, alternative measures of democracy and financial structure, and across different samples.
Introduction
The existence of well functioning financial markets are essential for overcoming the effects of information asymmetries and transaction costs that prevent the direct pooling and investment of society's savings. When financial markets work well, empirical evidence suggests that it is not only good for growth but also the growth is more likely to be pro-poor (Levine, 2005; Beck et al., 2007) .
Even though there is growing consensus on the positive relationship between finance and development, a long standing debate however is on the relative virtues of bank-based and marketbased financial systems. The success of market-based systems in the United Kingdom and the United States supports the viewpoint that market-based systems are superior in promoting growth and therefore should be adopted by the emerging market economies in Eastern Europe, Latin America and Asia. However, the role of bank-based systems in the industrialization of Germany and Japan provides a strong counter example. Cross-country evidence on the growth promoting virtues of one system over the other, on the other hand, remains inconclusive (Levine, 2002; Tadesse, 2002) .
In spite of a growing policy interest on the role of financial structure in promoting development, very little is known about how different financial structures emerge and evolve.
Broadly agreeing with this view Levine (1997, p. 702) writes, "We do not have adequate knowledge of why different financial structures emerge or why financial structures change?" In this paper we empirically assess the origins of financial structure. In particular, we focus on the role of political institutions. Political institutions and the quality of government could influence the nature of information asymmetries and transaction costs and shape financial structure. In a country with nondemocratic political institutions the information gap between a politically connected investor and an average saver could be wider because the former could easily seek credit for a bad project using political connections and the latter would be completely oblivious of such risk. In such a situation, a bank-based system could serve better in solving the information problem. Furthermore, nondemocratic governments could use their regulatory powers to create segmented monopolies for banks and thus creating a bank-based system. Banks in return could share a part of their rent resulting from regulated entry with the political elite (Haber, 2008) . Such a bank-based system with restricted entry would also benefit the incumbent political elite as this would severely constrain credit access of their political adversaries. The monopoly arrangement between the banks and the political elite however would break down with more political competition as the regulatory and political cost of sustaining the monopoly would increase. As a result, a market-based financial system would start taking over from the monopolistic banks. In summary, theory predicts that democratic political institutions could be one of the major determinants of financial structure.
We find evidence that indeed democratic political institutions matter for financial structure.
Using difference-in difference estimation and annual data, we study the effects of democratization or political liberalization on financial structure in a sample of 96 countries covering the period 1970 to 2005. Democratization or political liberalization here corresponds to the event of becoming a democracy. We find that democratization leads to a more market-based financial system. In particular, permanent democratization leads to one third of a sample standard deviation (=0.65, see column 1 table 3) increase in the financial structure activity 1 Democratic change could also be incremental rather than a one off. To identify the causal effect of incremental democratic change on financial structure we use panel data covering the period 1970 to 2005 and 96 countries. We find that a one unit increase in the democracy score measure. In other words, permanent democratization explains 35 per cent of the difference in financial structure in the United States (a predominantly market-based country with a score of 0.42) and Germany (a predominantly bankbased country with a score of -1.46) in the year 1995.
1 Section 2 explains the financial structure activity measure. Also see Appendix A1.
(which corresponds to a 20 point increase in POLITY2 scale) leads to 2.9 unit increase in the financial structure activity measure. This is indeed a large effect. The magnitude of the effect is 94 percent of the actual difference in financial structure between the United States (a market-based country) and Mexico (a bank-based country) in 1995. We also find that countries with substantial democratic capital are more likely to have a market-based financial structure. Democratic capital corresponds to a long history of democracy. Our main results are robust to a variety of controls, to instrumental variable estimation using commodity price and rainfall as instruments, Arellano-Bond GMM estimation, alternative measures of democracy and financial structure, as well as across different samples.
We make the following contributions in this paper. First, we present an empirical analysis of the political origins of financial structure. By using difference-in-difference estimation in a macro context we are able to estimate the causal effect of democratization on financial structure. Furthermore, we are also able to estimate the effect of incremental democratic change on financial structure. Our results in this regard are novel. Second, we use panel data for our analysis which is a significant departure from the existing empirical studies on financial structure. To the best of our knowledge, no other studies on the determinants of financial structure use panel data. Third, using commodity price and rainfall as instruments for democracy and income we are able to present credible estimates of the causal effects of democracy on financial structure. The difference-indifference estimation approach also allows us to present estimates of the causal effects of democratization.
The literature on financial development and economic growth is large. Levine (1997) and Beck and Levine (2005) for a survey of this literature.
Recently some studies have also looked at the impact of financial structure on economic growth (Levine, 2002; Tadesse, 2002; and Chakraborty and Ray, 2006) . The determinants of financial structure literature however are relatively small. To summarize, it is perhaps fair to say that the following four strands of thought stand out.
The first is the political institutions view of financial structure. The main idea is that nondemocratic states create rent for the existing banks by using their political power and regulation to restrict entry. In return, the near monopoly banks share a part of their rents with the political elite.
However the control of the banks over the financial sector diminishes with political competition as the political elite are no longer able to restrict entry (Haber, 2008; Wallis, 2008) . Haber (2008) show that the above theory explains the difference in financial structure in the United States and Mexico. Political competition in the United States led to a better developed and market-based financial system. In contrast Mexican politics was dominated by a small number of Mexican born Spanish elite who restricted entry into the financial sector. The result was an underdeveloped bankbased financial system. Sylla (2008) also presents a similar explanation for American financial development. He argues that political unification, limited government achieved through horizontal and vertical separation of power, and strong leadership 3
The second is the legal origin view of the financial structure pioneered by La Porta et al. (1998) . The principal idea behind this theory helped achieve the 'financial revolution' in the United States in the late eighteenth century. We however could not locate an empirical study reporting systematic evidence on the role of political institutions in determining financial structure. is that the British justice system evolved to protect private property holders against the crown. As a result it puts a lot of emphasis on protecting the rights of the private property holder. In contrast, the French justice system evolved to reduce the discretionary power of the corrupt judiciary. Therefore the state chose to codify legal procedure as much as possibly to make the judiciary close to redundant. In the long-run this resulted into an increase in the power of the state vis-à-vis the individual. Therefore, private property rights are relatively weaker in the French legal tradition. Private property rights are crucial to financial development as it protects the rights of the investor. Therefore countries that have acquired British legal tradition through conquest, colonization, or imitation tend to have better financial markets than French legal tradition countries (La Porta et al., 1998; Beck et al., 2003) . One can easily extend this theory to include financial structure as countries with better property rights institutions are likely to have more market-based finance than bank-based finance (Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2001 ). We do control for legal origin in our model, first, by including country dummies, and second, by including socialist legal origin dummy.
The third is the economic development view of financial structure. The principal idea is that rapidly developing economies create additional demand for external finance for the firms. Not all of this additional demand can be catered for by the banks. This leads to the development of marketbased financial systems. To illustrate this idea, Boyd and Smith (1998) present a theoretical model where capital accumulation is financed externally through a combination of debt and equity. The role of market-based finance increases as the economy develops. A separate but related story comes from the supply side. Economic development creates opportunities for financial institutions to save on monitoring costs and a market-based system emerges with low levels of monitoring.
Chakaraborty and Ray (2007) present a model illustrating the supply side argument. They show that the distribution of wealthy and poor in a society determines its financial structure. Wealthy individuals pose less moral hazard risks relative to poor individuals. Therefore financial institutions can save on monitoring cost by choosing not to monitor the wealthy. The converse is true however with poor individuals. Therefore, developed societies are likely to have market-based financial system. The converse is expected in societies with low income. Empirical studies estimating the causal effects of development on financial structure are rare. Goldsmith (1969) however is an exception. Goldsmith presents evidence that nonbank financial intermediaries and stock markets grow relative to banks in size and importance as countries expand economically. Goldsmith's evidence is based on data from Germany and the United Kingdom.
Finally, the fourth is the social capital view of financial structure. Countries with high level of social capital suffer less from moral hazard related risks. This allows financial markets to flourish (Guiso et al., 2000) . Guiso et al. (2000) also finds evidence that social capital and informal rules played a critical role in the financial sector development in Italy. One can easily extend this theory to accommodate financial structure. High level of social capital and low moral hazard related risk allows the financial institutions to save on monitoring cost and non-monitored (market-based) finance flourish relative to monitored (bank-based) finance. We control for social capital in our model by including country fixed effects, and time varying country fixed effects. The time varying country fixed effects control for the time varying but country specific aspects of unobservable such as social capital and culture.
Our paper is related to a large literature on the determinants of financial development.
However, it should be noted that our focus is on the determinants of financial structure and not on financial development. Beck and Levine (2005) presents a comprehensive survey of the determinants of financial development literature. La Porta et al. (1998) presents the legal origin view. Bhattacharyya and Hodler (2010b) find that natural resources weaken contracting institutions and as a result have detrimental effect on financial development. Beck et al. (2003) find that disease environment and legal origin explains majority of the cross-country variation in financial development using a cross-section sample of 70 former colonies. Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) show that the disease environment impacts on financial development through property rights institutions and not contracting institutions. Rajan and Zingales (2003) pose a different view and argue that incumbent financial institutions oppose financial development because it breeds competition. Therefore incumbents are likely to oppose financial development using their market power. The incumbent's opposition is likely to be weaker when an economy allows cross-border trade and capital flows. Therefore, trade openness and capital flows are likely to promote financial development. They find evidence in support of their hypothesis using data from 24 countries over the period 1913 to 1999. Our paper is also related to a large literature on financial development and economic growth. Levine (1997) and Beck and Levine (2005) presents an excellent survey of this literature.
Our paper is perhaps closest to the recent literature on financial structure and growth. Allen and Gale (2000) provide an excellent analytical comparison of different financial systems and their impact on growth. Levine (2002) using a cross-country dataset covering 48 countries report that financial structure do not matter for growth. Tadesse (2002) in contrast show bank-based system outperforms market-based system in emerging market economies. The converse is noticed in developed economies. In a theory paper, Chakraborty and Ray (2006) show that financial systems emerge through firm-financing choices 5 The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the difference-in difference estimation approach and how democratization influences financial structure. Section 3 discusses the impact of incremental changes in democracy and democratic capital on financial structure. Section 4 concludes. and neither system is superior to the other in terms of growth. Bank-based system however yields higher investments and lower inequality. The research presented in this paper, however, is different from the abovementioned as we aim to estimate the causal relationship from democratization and democracy to financial structure.
Democratization and Financial Structure

Econometric Strategy and Data
In order to estimate the causal effect of democratization on financial structure we follow the difference-in-difference approach used by Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005) . We estimate the following model: is a measure of democratization in country i which takes the value 1 for the years post-democratization and 0 otherwise, and it X is a vector of other control variables which includes an interaction term between socialist legal origin dummy and democratization and a vector of interaction between the year dummy and continental dummies. Table 3 provides more details on the control variables.
The key coefficient of interest here is G . Countries experiencing democratization over the sample period are considered to be 'treated' and the others as 'controls'. In particular, the control countries are those that were always democratic or always non-democratic during the sample period of 1970 to 2005. The financial structure in the treated countries before and after the treatment is compared with the financial structure in the control countries during the same time period. Thus the methodology makes use of both within-country as well as between-country variation in the data.
The country and year dummy variables eliminate biases originating from time invariant country characteristics and time varying common shocks which may influence both democratization and financial structure. Following Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005) we also include an interaction term between democratization and socialist legal origin to control for any systematic effect on financial structure and democratization originating from the transitional economies (former Soviet bloc countries). In addition, interaction terms between the year fixed effects and continental dummies (Asia, Africa, Latin America, and Socialist Legal Origin) are always included in the vector of control variables to make sure that the average treated country is not very different from the average control country. Furthermore, countries those are always democratic or always non-democratic during the sample period are always included in the control group to increase the likelihood that the average treated country is similar to the average control country. True standard errors of G , the coefficient on democratization, could be an underestimate due to the presence of serial correlation.
We follow Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005) to tackle this problem and use clustered standard errors where the clustering is on countries.
Note that the difference-in-difference estimate could be biased if the treatments are not random or if the treated and controlled countries are systematically different from each other. Even though we take several steps discussed above to minimize the likelihood of such a bias, it must be said that the possibility of reverse causality due to omitted time varying factors cannot be ruled out completely in a macro context. Therefore, one should be aware of this caveat while interpreting the results. However, we do find similar results using a more continuous measure of democracy and international commodity price as instrument in section 3 which leads us to believe that our evidence of a causal relationship from democracy to a more market-based financial system is reliable.
How does the difference-in-difference methodology differ from the two standard empirical approaches in the macro literature, namely: a) cross country regression, and b) panel regression?
Cross country regression is perhaps the simplest approach which uses financial structure as the dependent variable and democratization as the independent variable. Omitted variable and reverse causation are major limitations of this approach which could potentially bias the estimated coefficients. Finding good instruments are often regarded as a remedy to this problem. However, good instruments are hard to find. Furthermore, cross-section analysis often throws away useful time variation in the data. Panel regressions in contrast do exploit time series variation in the data.
However, this approach relies heavily on untestable and sometimes restrictive identifying assumptions such as the exclusion restrictions. Furthermore, fixed effect models rely only on within-country variation whereas the difference-in-difference approach exploits both within as well as between country variations in the data. One way to circumvent the identification issues in panel regressions is to use valid instruments. We do adopt this strategy in section 3 when we estimate the impact of incremental changes in democracy and democratic capital on financial structure.
Note that the underlying democracy measure used to calculate it ation Democratiz is POLITY2 score from the Polity IV database, which is described by Marshall and Jaggers (2002) .
This database reports democracy and autocracy scores, which both vary between 0 and 10 with 10 being the most democratic or most autocratic, respectively. The democracy score measures competition and openness in the electoral process, and the autocracy score measures suppression of competitiveness over executive recruitment, lack of constraints on the executive, and regulation of participation. Note that the democracy and autocracy scales do not share any categories in common.
The POLITY2 score is the difference between democracy and autocracy scores which runs between -10 and +10. Following Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005) we define democratization
) in a country if it's POLITY2 score turns from negative to positive.
However, not all democratic change is permanent. We consider two types of democratization here.
First, we consider democratization episodes that are not subsequently reversed. It is denoted by the treatment 'PERMANENT' in table 3. Second, we consider both temporary and permanent democratization episodes as long as they last at least four years. This is in line with the expectation that it takes time for democratic change to influence financial structure. It is denoted by the treatment 'ALL' in table 3. Note that in situations where the democratic change last less than four years, we ignore such change and code it is if it did not occur. Furthermore, following Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005) we also discard democratic change that took place in the last three years of the sample. The dependent variable in such situations is set to be missing. We use three measures of financial structure. First, is a measure of financial structure activity ( it FSA ) which is defined as the log of the ratio of 'stock market total value traded ratio' and 'bank credit ratio'. Levine (2002) classifies this as a measure of financial structure activity (
as it compares the activity of stock markets relative to that of banks. The 'stock market total value traded ratio' is defined as the value of domestic equities traded on domestic exchanges divided by GDP; and 'bank credit ratio' is defined as the value of deposit money banks credit to the private sector divided by GDP. Second, is a measure of financial structure size ( it FSS ) which is defined as the log of the ratio of 'stock market capitalization ratio' and 'bank credit ratio'. Third, is a measure of financial structure efficiency ( Table 2, panel A presents summary statistics of these variables.
We also control for log GDP per capita in order to account for the economic development view of financial structure proposed by Goldsmith (1969) , Boyd and Smith (1998), and Ray (2007) . The GDP per capita PPP data is sources from the World Bank.
Evidence
Figure 1 presents bar charts of financial structure activity (FSA) in democracies, nondemocracies and all countries in the sample over the period 1970 to 2005. Countries with a positive POLITY2 score are classified as democracies and the rest as non-democracies. The data shows that democracies are systematically more bank based than non-democracies over all periods except for the 1970s. Furthermore, the data also shows that there is a global trend in moving more towards bank based financial structure since the 1970s. Table 3 presents the results of difference-in-difference estimates. Column 1 reports the impact of permanent democratization or treatments that are subsequently not reversed. The coefficient estimate suggest that democratization increases the financial structure activity measure In column 3 we investigate the timing of these effects by replacing democratization with a dummy variable equal to 1 in the 3 years preceding democratization, a dummy variable equal to 1 in the year of democratization and in the following 3 years, and a dummy variable equal to 1 from year 4 after democratization and onwards. We find no significant effect of the 3 years prior to democratization. However the movement towards a more market based system shows up immediately after democratization (see coefficient on 3 Year post Democratization) and it also has a lasting impact on financial structure (see coefficient on 4 Year onwards post Democratization). In columns 4 -9 we deal with size and efficiency measures of financial structure and the results are qualitatively similar.
In summary, the evidence suggests that democratization triggers a move towards a more market based financial systems. The transition to a more market based financial system starts immediately after democratization and it also appears to have a lasting impact. The latter is consistent with the findings reported in section 3 on the impact of democratic capital.
Democracy, Democratic Capital and Financial Structure
Econometric Strategy and Data
Democratic change could also be incremental rather than a one off. Therefore an ordinal measure of democracy would allow us to distinguish between different shades of democracy. In this section we test the effect of incremental democratic change on financial structure. Furthermore, we also test the impact of democratic capital on financial structure. We use panel data covering the period 1970 to 2005 and 96 countries in the following empirical model. The list of countries is identical to section 2 (see table 1 ). Note that due to data limitations not all specifications cover exactly 96 countries and in most specifications the panel is unbalanced.
High frequency macro data is often noisy. In order to smooth out business cycle fluctuations or any other noise we use five year averages in our main specification reported in table 4, column 3.
However, there is a trade off as this could amount to throwing away useful information. Note that five year averages here are in contrast to section 2 (see table 3) where we use annual data in order to successfully implement the difference-in-difference estimation strategy in a macro context. Nevertheless, we also test our model using annual data and our result remains qualitatively unaffected (see J is our focus parameter. We expect 1 J to be positive and statistically significant, as theory predicts that incremental democratic change should favor market-based financial systems (Haber, 2008 and Wallis, 2008) . Log GDP per capita controls for the economic development view of financial structure (see Goldsmith, 1969; Boyd and Smith, 1998; and Chakraborty and Ray, 2007) .
Similar to section 2 we use all three measures of financial structure. However, in In order to estimate the causal impact of Incremental democratic change on financial structure we certainly need to address the concern of endogeneity as financial structure may also influence democratization. In a country with predominantly market based financial system it could be easier for the opposition politicians to gain access to finance in order to finance their campaigns.
This could lead to democratic change. In such situation, estimating model (2) using the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation method would produce a biased estimate. In order to address such concern we estimate the model using lagged democracy and lagged GDP per capita as instruments (see table 4 , column 6). We also estimate the model using international commodity price ( 5 ). They are also exogenous as rainfall is geography based and commodity price is driven by global demand exogenous to individual countries. It is also unlikely that they would affect financial structure through any other channel. Therefore, the chance of violating the exclusion restriction is fairly low. Furthermore, we estimate the model using the is calculated using the Polity IV database. The POLITY2 score which runs between -10 and +10 is averaged over the period 9 t to 5 t . We rescale these averages such that Panel B of table 2 reports summary statistics of all the major variables used in this section.
Evidence
In Note that we use five year averages here in order to smooth out business cycle fluctuations and noise in macro data. However, this could also imply throwing out useful information. In order to be certain we use annual data in column 4 and our results remain qualitatively unchanged.
In column 5 we test the impact of democratic capital by replacing 5 it D by the fraction of years a country has been democratic since 1950 ( 5 it d ). The theoretical prior here is that a longer running democracy could be important. Furthermore, being a long run measure 5 it d is better able to tackle reverse causality. We find that the result remains qualitatively unchanged. Democratic change yields more market-based financial systems.
In columns 5 and 6, we put our results under further scrutiny. We use the following two strategies in order to address reverse causality concerns. First, we use lagged democracy ( Our main result remains unaltered. Table 5 reports the first stage regressions when international commodity price and rainfall are used as instruments. In column 7 we estimate a dynamic model using the Arellano and Bond GMM. We find that on average democratic change leads to a movement towards market based financial system.
In Tables 6 and 7 we check the robustness of our result using alternative measures of democracy (table 6) and alternative measures of financial structure ( Table 8 tests whether the effect of democracy on financial structure is heterogeneous depending on the income class of a country. We divide the sample into high income, middle income, low income, and very low income countries and find that the democracy effect is significant for both high income and low income countries. However, for middle income countries the effect is not significant. For very low income countries we observe the effect running in the opposite direction. In other words, democratic change for very low income countries yield bank based financial systems. This could be due to the scarcity of capital in these countries. Perhaps below a certain threshold level of income there is not enough capital in the country to set up a market-based financial system. Note that country specific fixed effect plus time trend ( t i i E D ) and the time varying common shock ( t I ) in our main model controls for omitted variable bias. However, in order to be certain that we have tackled omitted variable concerns adequately we test the robustness of our results using additional covariates in table 9. In columns 1 -3 we add foreign direct investments, trade liberalization index and trade share respectively. Rajan and Zingales (2003) argue that trade liberalization and foreign investments help ease the grip of the elite on the financial markets and hence are beneficial for financial market development. Therefore one would expect countries open to trade and capital flows are likely to be more market-based. Our basic result survives in all three occasions. In column 4 we introduce schooling as an additional control. High level of schooling may enable citizens to handle transactions in a complex market-based financial system. Our result survives. Column 5 uses Gini coefficient as an additional control. Chakraborty and Ray (2007) present a theoretical model showing that highly skewed wealth distribution is a hindrance towards market-based financial development. Our result remains unaltered in spite of a reduction in sample size. Beck (2011) show that resource rich countries are predominantly bank based as resource rich country governments typically deposit resource revenue with local banks. In column 6 we use resource rent per capita as an additional control and our result is unaltered.
Finally in table 10 we test whether our result suffers from continental heterogeneity. In columns 1-6 we take out countries belonging to Africa, Asia, Europe, the Americas, Neo-Europe , and the OECD from the base sample respectively. Furthermore, we also test for outliers using the Cook's distance, DFITS, and Welsch distance formula in columns 7 -9. In column 10 we exclude major oil producers (ten largest oil producers according to the CIA World Factbook) from the sample. Our result survives on all occasions. Therefore, in summary, democratic change and democratic capital seem to matter for financial structure. More democratic political institutions appear to yield more market-based financial system.
Conclusions
There is a growing policy interest in the role of financial structure in promoting development. However, very little is known about how different financial structures emerge and evolve. In this paper we empirically assess the origins of financial structure. In particular, we focus on the role of political institutions and argue that indeed the quality of government matters for financial development and the shape financial structure. Using difference-in difference estimation and annual data, we study the effects of democratization or political liberalization on financial structure in a sample of 96 countries covering the period 1970 to 2005. Democratization or political liberalization here corresponds to the event of becoming a democracy. We find that democratization leads to a more market-based financial system. Democratic change could also be incremental rather than a one off. To identify the causal effect of incremental democratic change on financial structure we use panel data covering the period 1970 to 2005 and 96 countries. We find that a one unit increase in the democracy score leads to 2.9 unit increase in the financial structure activity measure.
We also find that countries with substantial democratic capital are more likely to have a marketbased financial structure. Our main results appear to be robust to a variety of tests.
There is a growing consensus among researchers in social science that political institutions and the quality of government play a crucial role in economic development. Our findings lend support to this view. It shows that policies are not random but an outcome of the quality and nature of political institutions. Political institutions through policy not only determine the level of financial development (Haber, 2008) it also shapes financial structure. Arguable financial structure is an important cog in the wheel of economic development (Levine, 2002; Tadesse, 2002) . Therefore, one implication of the study is that there are strong economic incentives for political reforms and democratization.
Appendix A
A.1 Data description
Financial Structure -Activity ( it FSA ): Log of the stock market total value traded ratio to bank credit ratio. Stock market total value traded ratio equals the value of domestic equities traded o domestic stock exchanges divided by GDP. Bank credit ratio is the deposit money bank credit as a share of GDP. Source: Beck et al. (2000) . Log Resource Rent per capita: log of the rent from natural resource (which includes energy, minerals, and forestry) per capita which is defined as the price minus the average extraction cost.
The data are described in Hamilton and Clemens (1999) . Note: The added-variable (or partial) plot presented above is the diagrammatic representations of the coefficient estimate in regression reported in table 3 column 1 using the difference-in difference estimation method. Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Belgium, Botswana, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ivory Coast, Cyprus, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyz Republic, Malaysia, Mauritius, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, United Kingdom, United States of America, Venezuela, Zimbabwe.
: Countries that Received no Treatment (ie., always democratic or always non-democratic)
Treated Countries (Year) Argentina (1983) , Armenia (1998 ), Bangladesh (1991 ), Bolivia (1982 ), Brazil (1985 , Bulgaria (1990 ), Chile (1989 ), Croatia (1999 ), Czech Republic (1990 , Ecuador (1979 ), El Salvador (1982 ), Estonia (1991 , Fiji (1990 ), Georgia (1991 ), Ghana (1996 ), Guatemala (1986 ), Hungary (1989 ), Indonesia (1999 ), Iran (1997 , Republic of Korea (1987 ), Latvia (1991 ), Lithuania (1991 ), Macedonia (1991 ), Malawi (1994 ), Mexico (1994 , Moldova (1991) , Mongolia (1990 ), Nepal (1990 ), Nigeria (1999 ), Panama (1989 ), Paraguay (1989 ), Peru (1993 ), Philippines (1986 ), Poland (1989 , Romania (1990 ), Russian Federation (1992 , Serbia and Montenegro (2000) , Slovak Republic (1990 ), Slovenia (1991 ), Spain (1976 ), Tanzania (2000 , Thailand (1992 ), Turkey (1983 , Uruguay (1985) , Zambia (1991) . Notes: ***, **, and * indicates significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively against a two sided alternative. Figures in the parentheses are cluster standard errors, and they are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and arbitrary intra-group correlation. Sample years are every year from 1970 to 2005. Democratization = 1 after democratization (ie., Polity 2 score turning positive). We consider two types of democratization. First, we consider democratization episodes that are not subsequently reversed. It is denoted by the Treatment 'PERMANENT'. Second, we consider both temporary and permanent democratization episodes as long as they lasted at least four years. It is denoted by the Treatment 'ALL'.
: Countries that Permanently Democratized with the year of Democratization
3 Year pre Democratization = 1 in the 3 years preceding democratization. Regressions always include country and year fixed effects, dummy variable for socialist legal origin interacted with democratization, log GDP per capita and an intercept. Notes: ***, **, and * indicate significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively against a two sided alternative. Figures in parentheses are clustered standard errors and they are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and arbitrary intra-group correlation. Sample years are every fifth year from 1970 to 2005. High Income is a dummy for per capita GDP in 2000 being 10,000 constant 1996 international dollars or more; Middle Income for between 5,000 and 10,000; Low Income for between 2,500 and 5,000; Very Low Income for less than 2,500. 
(8)
(10) Belsley et al. 1980 ). Here n is the number of observation and k is the number of independent variables including the intercept. In column 10, we exclude the ten largest oil exporters according to the CIA World Factbook.
OLS Estimates
